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Human rights within religions
Marco Ventura
Introduction: religious appropriation and rejection of human rights
Religion entertains a complex relation with human rights, the core of which can be theorized 
as a twofold dynamic of religious appropriation and rejection of human rights.
Religious leaders and scholars appropriate human rights by setting their doctrinal and 
normative tradition as the antecedent, source and condition of modern human rights. They 
endeavour to bridge human rights-friendly recent theological developments to the pre-existence 
of human rights in the relevant tradition under a different language and set of categories. David 
Daube makes the point for Jewish sources: ‘There is no rubric human rights in rabbinic literature 
or in Philo, yet the documentation bearing on the topic constitutes a veritable embarras de 
richesses’ (Daube 1979: 234). Religious leaders and scholars translate the apparently universal and 
neutral language of modern human rights into the specifi c categories of the relevant tradition, 
denomination and community; they thus elaborate a version of human rights, which not only 
supports and consolidates the principles and order of the relevant group, but also speaks to the 
outsiders and has the potential to convert them to the truth, or at least to gain their respect. Thus 
religiously appropriated human rights fulfi l a threefold task: (1) they secure an ordained religious 
community; (2) they shelter the religious community from the external threat; (3) they spread 
the religious message.
In order for this to be possible, rejection of human rights is necessary, whenever the 
relevant tradition, denomination or community is faced with ‘wrong’ human rights, such as 
for many believers the right of same-sex couples to marry, or with ‘right’ human rights with 
a ‘wrong’ scope of application, such as the right to religious freedom, if applied to dissenters, 
apostates or ‘sects’ that would be deemed unacceptable and dangerous from the relevant religious 
perspective.
Appropriation and rejection are not clear-cut, separate phases. They are intertwined. It is 
often impossible to isolate one dimension from the other. Appropriation needs rejection. 
Rejection is instrumental to appropriation.
The encounter of religion with human rights is usually discussed as one between two distinct 
and separate entities. Seemingly, the struggle of religion with human rights takes place outside 
the religious sphere, and concerns the relation of religion to an external object, human rights. 
Book 1.indb   161 20/11/14   2:56 PM
Marco Ventura
162
1 See Rosati and Stoeckl 2012: 3–6. The authors point at fi ve dimensions of post-secular societies: the 
complementary learning between religious and secular worldviews and practices; the co-existence of 
secular and religious worldviews and practices; the de-privatization of religions; religious pluralism as 
opposed to religious monopoly; and the concept of ‘the sacred’ understood not only as an immanent 
and civic force, but also as a heteronomous transcendent force.
Instead, if the twofold dynamic of appropriation and rejection is acknowledged, the reality 
emerges of a relation of religion to human rights, which is also, if not mainly internal to the 
religious sphere. Appropriation and rejection establish a circular process along which religion 
shapes human rights while being simultaneously shaped by human rights. To the discomfort of 
those actors who sever human rights from religion, or vice-versa, human rights are not an 
external, separated reality. They belong to religion. As a consequence the challenge of human 
rights to religion is also, if not mainly, a challenge within religion.
This chapter investigates the twofold pattern of appropriation and rejection, and the resulting 
challenge within religion, in three steps. In the fi rst step, the internal complexity of the categories 
of ‘human rights’ and ‘religion’ will be studied and the interaction of religion and human 
rights will be highlighted. In the second step the challenge of human rights to religion will 
be investigated fi rst in its external dimension, with (1) religion requiring laws of general 
applicability to conform to a given human rights standard; and (2) laws of general applicability 
requiring religious communities to conform to a given human rights standard; and second in 
its internal dimension, with intra-religious tensions resulting from the individuals’ and groups’ 
effort to reform the community through human rights. As a development of the second step, the 
third step will observe the impact of human rights on religious laws, with the twofold pattern 
of appropriation and rejection driving a twofold movement of reform and preservation of 
religious laws.
In the face of the subject’s complexity, this chapter has a very limited goal. This is neither an 
in-depth analysis nor a comprehensive review of the literature. This is just a tentative outline of 
the mutual infl uence of human rights and religious laws, resulting in the appropriation and 
rejection of human rights within religions.
The internal complexity of human rights and religion
Since the end of the Cold War, human rights and religion have emerged as the most powerful 
response to the collapse of traditional State-based sovereignty and to the declining project of 
secular modernity.1
Many people around the world experience human rights and/or religion as a set of deeply 
held beliefs and practices. Moreover, human rights and religion share four extremely appealing 
and successful features. First, human rights and religion fi t into the global world through their 
claim of universality and their ambition to encompass cultural, national and communitarian 
differences. Second, they are easy to identify with, thanks to their polymorphic doctrines and 
practices: while providing a belief to stand for, an identity, and a sense of righteousness and 
justice, human rights and religion leave a lot of room for negotiation and adjustments. Third, they 
are post-secular: they are in conversation with the secular, but are not trapped in the secular 
dogma of separation of the civil and the religious, the temporal and the spiritual. Fourth, their 
normativity is compatible with State law, while being autonomous from it: religious laws and 
human rights law are able to transcend the law of the land and to survive the crisis of traditional 
State-based sovereignty.
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A formidable source of mobilization and an effective agent of transformation, human rights 
and religion tend to be understood according to a binary paradigm. Human rights and religion 
are compatible or incompatible, friends or foes. The paradigm rests on the assumption that each 
of the two categories of human rights and religion corresponds to a clear and distinct set of 
concepts. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im contests such approach when he looks at the relationship 
between human rights and Islam:
Framing the question of whether Islam is inherently compatible or incompatible with 
human rights is problematic. The question assumes that there is a verifi ably identifi able 
monolithic ‘Islam’ to be contrasted with a defi nitively settled preconceived notion of 
‘human rights’. But who can defi nitively and exhaustively know what Islam is and what 
human rights are? No human being, whether self-identifying as a Muslim or not, can 
defi nitely and exhaustively ‘know’ Islam, and no proposed human rights norms can 
qualify as universal standards unless and until they are accepted as such by their human 
subjects. The most anyone can legitimately speak of is his or her view of Islam, never Islam 
as such, and of human rights as they are already accepted by people around the world, 
including Muslims. 
(An-Na’im 2012: 56)
An-Na’im’s claim can be extended to other religions and cultures. Werner Menski understands 
Hinduism and human rights as two terms that ‘have many meanings and are internally plural 
concepts’ (Menski 2012: 71). Awareness that human rights and religion are each an extremely 
rich and dynamic universe is widespread among scholars. Equally shared is the consequent 
awareness that precisely because of their inherent plurality, human rights and religion cannot 
be separated, that they overlap and interact, and that the categories of compatibility and 
incompatibility betray a complex reality. Still, the assumption that human rights and religion are 
two monoliths, each bearing a clear identity based on an internally uniform system of norms and 
values, dominates the language of the media and the mind of many actors alike. The scholarly 
rejection of a simplistic understanding of human rights and religion as two wholesale, independent 
systems coexists with the actors’ eagerness on clear-cut defi nitions.
Many actors feel that the internal uniformity and clear-cut identity of human rights and 
religion is vital to the possibility of believing in human rights and/or in religion, while being 
indispensable to the enterprise of advancing human rights and/or religion. The understanding 
and study of human rights and religion as internally complex systems, variably interacting and 
combining, cannot but challenge the authority of those who hold the power to defi ne 
and administer the orthodoxy and functioning of human rights on the one hand and of religion 
on the other. In particular, it is embarrassing for those who identify with human rights as an 
internally solid universe, not necessarily related to religion or to one specifi c religion or denomi-
nation, to realize how complex human rights are, and how deeply they depend on religion. By 
analogy, the internal complexity of religion as an effect of human rights challenges those who 
understand religious traditions, denominations and communities as internally uniform entities, 
having the priority on, and often the paternity of, human rights.
The interaction between religion and human rights is essential to the forging of each of 
the two categories as an internally complex and diverse world. If the internal complexity of 
human rights is largely dependent on the religious factor, which shaped and still shapes different 
concepts of human rights, the internal complexity of religion is by large the effect of the 
debate triggered within religious traditions, denominations and communities by the emergence 
of modern human rights.
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2 For a critique of the abuse of human rights as a religion, see Ignatieff 2003.
3 A variation of this position would include voices contrary to an explicit, universalist, religious foundation 
of human rights. Opposing sceptical views of a non-religious foundation of human rights, David Little 
argues in favour of a ‘public reason’ foundation, based on a ‘secular rationale’. See Little 2012, in 
particular pp. 135–7.
Religious variations of human rights
Beliefs on which human rights are built make the seemingly compact category of human rights 
a constellation of internally diverse systems of human rights. A certain set of beliefs is necessary 
to the foundation of any system of human rights, from Christian natural law to Jewish noachid 
principles, from dharma driven human rights to ubuntu driven human rights, and from the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights of 1986. Foundational beliefs also defi ne the establishment and operation of systems of 
protection of human rights. The negotiation of ideals and reality, the role of the State and of 
State-independent agencies, and the degree of rules’ enforcement, which defi ne the true identity 
of any given system of human rights, are indeed dependent on a set of underlying beliefs.
The relation to beliefs is crucial to the ambition of human rights to bridge non-religious and 
religious worldviews as well as alternative religious worldviews. Such ambition can be fulfi lled 
in two alternative ways.
According to the fi rst way, one can argue for the possibility to agree on human rights without 
agreeing on the fundamentals of life in general and on God(s) in particular. Many advocates of 
the international law of human rights would defend its universality as intrinsically dependent 
on its neutrality towards beliefs (as the slogan would go ‘human rights are not a religion’2). They 
would argue that the values underlying universal human rights do not qualify as beliefs, and 
therefore are accessible to all, believers and non believers, this being indeed the key to the 
superiority of human rights on religion, and to the need for religions to embrace human rights, 
for the sake of a pacifi ed, religiously and ideologically diverse global world.3
According to the second way, human rights can be held permeable to any religious or non-
religious belief, based on the conviction that all religious or non-religious doctrines share some 
fundamentals about human dignity and rights. Human rights themselves would be the distillation 
of those principles of morality that are shared across the various beliefs (see Küng 1985). In this 
vein Kevin Boyle argues that ‘human rights law is not placing itself at some higher level or plane 
above religion or non-religious beliefs. Rather it is accommodating to the plurality of such 
beliefs in the world while drawing its inspiration from the principles of justice and ethics shared 
by all religions and humanist beliefs’ (Boyle 2007: 28).
In the face of claims that it is possible to conceive ‘universal foundations [of human rights], 
religious or nonreligious’, that should hold good ‘for all groups and communities of every 
nation’, Johannes van der Ven contends that the ‘manifest plurality of worldviews worldwide’ 
makes universal foundations impossible (2010: 167). Taking into account the reality of multiple 
beliefs underlying multiple versions of human rights, van der Ven rather argues in favour of 
‘particular foundations’, responding to ‘the right of individual (religious or nonreligious) 
communities, including global ones, to endeavour – as in fact they do – to ground human rights 
in a view or concept that, from that community’s perspective, grounds and substantiate them’ 
(2010: 167).
If beliefs in general are a crucial factor for the internal differentiation of human rights, for 
the competition between concurring systems of human rights, and for the legal arbitration of the 
competition thereof, beliefs that qualify as religious are decisive in the process of differentiation 
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4 As Irene Bloom underlines: ‘In some parts of the world, including India and much of the Islamic world, 
human rights ideas have been understood by many as a challenge to traditional values on the part 
of Western observers whose appreciation of indigenous cultural dispositions and religious beliefs or of 
social and economical realities may be found wanting. In other parts of the world, including Latin 
America and much of Eastern Europe, the problems have had to do less with the perceived ‘foreignness’ 
of human rights norms than with the confrontation between religious institutions and authoritarian 
political regimes or, more recently, with confl ict among ethnic and religious groups who perceive their 
interests to be at odds’ (Bloom 1996: 8).
5 Georg Jellinek famously held this principle in Jellinek 1974. For the understanding of the principle see 
DeGirolami 2013: 232, fn. 44. Jean-Philippe Schreiber sees the prioritization of religious freedom as a 
negative trend in contemporary law and politics. He deprecates the ‘subordination of certain fundamental 
rights to a sacralised religious freedom’ as well as the ‘prevalence of a sovereign religious freedom for 
reasons of politics or ideology on the one hand and of identity on the other’ (Schreiber 2012: 28) 
[Author’s translation: ‘soumettre certains droits fondamentaux à une liberté religieuse sacralisée . . . 
prévale une liberté religieuse considérée comme souveraine, aux yeux des uns pour des motifs politiques 
ou idéologiques, aux yeux des autres pour des raisons identitaires.’]
6 Referring to the debate on Asian values and human rights, Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury 
underline that ‘at the center of the culturalist arguments against human rights in the debate have been 
authoritarianism and communitarianism’, both somehow linked with the inextricable mix of culture 
and religion in Asia. Yet, the authors challenge the assumption, stressing that ‘all religious and cultural 
traditions have both communitarian and individualistic and hierarchical and equalitarian tendencies’ 
(Avonius and Kingsbury 2008: 7–8).
7 Flores 2008: 294. [Author’s translation: ‘la convinzione che solo l’Occidente, per storia e tradizione, 
abbia un legame solido e coerente con la cultura dei diritti umani.’] Here Flores is simply presenting the 
theory, and not endorsing it.
8 Amartya Sen celebrates ‘Ashoka’s dedicated championing of religious and other kinds of tolerance’ 
(Sen 2006: 50). Federico Squarcini contests Sen’s simplistic reading of Ashoka’s religious politics. 
See Squarcini 2011. Amartya Sen further articulates his critique of an ‘immaculate Western 
conception’ of rights: ‘The presumption that all this is the result of the fl owering of an entirely 
of systems of human rights, their impact resulting in a set of religious variations of human rights, 
heavily dependent on cultures, times and places.4
Religious variations of human rights can go as far as to challenge the very structure of rights. 
With regard to the understanding of human rights in Judaism, Asher Maoz explains that ‘Judaism 
does not propound a concept of rights but adheres to a concept of duties, not only in the 
relationship between man and God, but also in the relationship between man and man’ (Maoz 
2004: 680). The author concludes that in the halachic tradition ‘because of the emphasis put 
on the performance of a duty, the complainant enjoys a far better chance of her “right” being 
honoured, than in a rights-oriented jurisprudence’ (ibid.: 686).
Religious variations of human rights emerge in four areas. They can determine the foundation 
of human rights (e.g. Bible-based human rights, Islamic human rights or secular/neutral human 
rights), the catalogue of human rights (e.g. in the case of the exclusion of LGBT Rights or of the 
right to change one’s own religion), the internal hierarchy of human rights (e.g. the precedence 
of religious freedom as ‘the fi rst liberty’5), the universality of human rights, and the cultural 
dimension of human rights (e.g. the debate on Asian values based human rights6).
Transversal to the four areas, the Western connotation of human rights, the ‘conviction that 
only the West, for reasons of history and tradition, has a solid and coherent bond with the culture 
of human rights’,7 is a strong ingredient in the debate on religious variations of human rights. 
Two patterns emerge. First, the Western paternity and/or monopoly of human rights can be 
rejected. Amartya Sen resorts to emphasizing the religious benignity of Indian emperor Ashoka 
in order to contest the Western dominance on human rights.8 Second, the Western paternity 
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sequestrated ‘Western civilization,’ developing in splendid isolation, would be a serious illusion. Praising 
an imagined insularity does little justice to the way learning and thinking tend to progress in the world, 
drawing on developments in different regions. Ideas and knowledge cultivated in the West have, in 
recent centuries, dramatically changed the contemporary world, but it would be hard to see it as an 
immaculate Western conception’ (Sen 2006: 57).
 9 The combination of Marxist and Christian elements in the advocacy of human rights was the reason 
why the Roman Catholic Church condemned theologians associated to the so-called liberation 
theology. See Congregation for the doctrine of the faith, ‘Instruction on certain aspects of the ‘theology 
of liberation’, 6 August 1984. Available at www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/
documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19840806_theology-liberation_en.html. The Instruction accused some 
Roman Catholic theologians to borrow Marxist theories and stated that ‘concepts uncritically borrowed 
from Marxist ideology and recourse to theses of a biblical hermeneutic marked by rationalism are at the 
basis of the new interpretation which is corrupting whatever was authentic in the generous initial 
commitment on behalf of the poor’ (VI, n. 10). The Instruction also condemned atheistic and Marxist’s 
denial of rights in the following terms: ‘Let us recall the fact that atheism and the denial of the human 
person, his liberty and rights, are at the core of the Marxist theory. This theory, then, contains errors 
which directly threaten the truths of the faith regarding the eternal destiny of individual persons’ 
(VII, n. 9).
10 The understanding of subsystems within religions, by reference to confl icting human rights claims, can 
benefi t from the refl ection on ‘minorities within minorities’. See Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005.
of human rights can be advocated for the sake of either a pro-Western or an anti-Western 
discourse. The two patterns have a serious impact on religious variations of human rights. In the 
Western media and public, human rights are often taken as a secular and modern construct, 
inevitably colliding with those pre-modern religious traditions that could not conceive of 
rights, equality, rule of law and civil liberties as they are understood in liberal democracies. 
Human rights can also be seen as a secularized form of Christianity confl icting with non-
Christian religions and cultures: hence the non-Western critique of self-appointed culture-free 
and religion-free human rights as Western Christian neo-imperialism in disguise. Analogously, 
a certain version of human rights can be seen as grounded on Protestant Christianity or 
liberal Christianity, incompatible as such not just with non-Christian religions, but also with 
non-Protestant or non-liberal Christianity. Hybrid versions, combining secular and religious 
human rights, intra-Christian ecumenical human rights, inter-religious (e.g. Judeo-Christian) 
human rights and a pro- and anti-Western stance are also possible, as in the case of Marxist 
Christian advocacy of human rights.9
These are very general and superfi cial attempts to grasp the internal complexity of human 
rights, and the role of religion in its making. Every attempt to go beyond labels risks getting 
trapped into the forging of new labels and defi nitions, just more specifi c, but no less inaccurate.10 
Jewish orthodox human rights, or Roman Catholic human rights might seem a step forward in 
the understanding of religious variations of indistinctively Jewish or Christian human rights, but 
they are likely to turn into yet another ossifi cation and oversimplifi cation of a much richer 
universe, including internal variations of Jewish or Christian human rights.
For a more accurate picture to emerge, religious variations of human rights and human rights’ 
variations of religion have to be taken into account jointly.
Human rights’ variations of religion
If religion redefi nes human rights through the twofold movement of appropriation and 
rejection, thus producing religious variations of human rights, in turn human rights redefi ne 
and differentiate religion. Since their modern invention in the eighteenth century, human rights 
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11 In 1832 Gregory XVI condemned modern freedoms, explaining that ‘[e]xperience shows, even 
from earliest times, that cities renowned for wealth, dominion, and glory perished as a result of this 
single evil, namely immoderate freedom of opinion, license of free speech, and desire for novelty.’ 
Gregory XVI, ‘Encyclical Mirari Vos on Liberalism and religious indifferentism’, 1832. Available at 
www.papalencyclicals.net/Greg16/g16mirar.htm.
12 Declaration Dignitatis humanae upheld fundamental rights and in particular religious freedom. For the 
background of the declaration, see Scatena 2003.
have prompted variations of religion, which have increased and reshaped the internal diversity of 
religious traditions, denominations and communities.
Roman Catholic Popes opposed liberal rights in the nineteenth century,11 but changed their 
position after World War II, in particular at the Second Vatican Council,12 and rose as the 
champions of human rights worldwide, to the extent that the Holy See featured among the 
signatories of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the seventh principle of which prescribed respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief. The change in the Catholic doctrine and the activism of the Holy See in 
favour of international human rights law engendered internal dissent. One of the main reasons 
for the tension between Rome and the Society Pius X, culminating in the excommunication by 
Pope John Paul II of the leaders of the Society in 1988, was the latter’s rejection of the doctrine 
of the Second Vatican Council on freedom of conscience and religion, on the grounds that the 
Council’s teaching was inconsistent with the Catholic tradition.
Human rights variations of Roman Catholicism are just one of the many possible examples 
showing how religious leaders and communities react in different ways to human rights, while 
this increases and reshuffl es the internal difference of religion in general, and of religious 
traditions, denominations and communities in particular. The relevant religious understanding 
of human rights has grown so important that it often poses as an identity marker, making a given 
religious tradition, denomination and community what it is in the eyes of both members and 
outsiders. Many Christians would see the Christian paternity and endorsement of international 
human rights as an essential expression of what Christianity is about. Analogously, many non-
Christians would see certain human rights, if not the whole fabric of human rights as such, as a 
tool for Christian neo-imperialism. Also, many religious communities would see the rejection of 
certain rights, such as those related to sexual orientation, as a necessity in the light of the relevant 
religious identity.
If the Catholic example is blatant, human rights’ variations of religion can be observed in 
different times and places, across religious lines. Endorsing a project of human rights based 
modernity, reform of family law in India and in Tunisia in the 1950s has changed, and diversifi ed, 
Hindu law and Islamic law. Half a century later, constitutional reforms in Iraq, Tunisia and Egypt, 
combining a reference to Islam, and sometimes to Islamic law, with recognition of fundamental 
rights, have also reshaped, and diversifi ed, the Muslim landscape. The debate within the Anglican 
Communion and the Mormon Church of Jesus Christ and the Latter Day Saints on gender 
equality and LGBT rights in the access to ordained ministry is but a further example of the 
human rights’ impact on religion, that is of human rights variations of religion.
These examples show that although religious variations of human rights and human rights’ 
variations of religion are multi-dimensional, and mobilize the social, the theological and the 
political element, the legal dimension plays a crucial role in the circular process establishing a 
continuum between the religion-based differentiation of human rights and the human rights-
based differentiation of religion. The next chapter will investigate this legal dimension and its 
twofold external and internal character.
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13 European Court of Human Rights, Kokkinakis v. Greece, 19 April 1993, Appl. No. 14307/88, para. 31.
The external and internal laws of religion and human rights
Both human rights and religion being highly normative, the legal dimension has a special salience 
in the encounter and interaction of the two. From this perspective, religious variations of human 
rights and human rights’ variations of religion translate into, respectively, an external and an 
internal law of religion and human rights.
The external law of religion and human rights describes how religious traditions, 
denominations and communities affect the defi nition and protection of human rights for the 
general public, thus posing as the legal ingredient of religious variations of human rights. On 
the other hand, the internal law of religion and human rights rather describes how human rights 
affect religious laws and organized religion in relation to their members, this being the legal 
component of human rights’ variations of religion.
The following two sections briefl y highlight the external and the internal laws of religion and 
human rights.
External law of religion and human rights
The external law of religion and human rights takes shape through the religious infl uence on 
those laws, such as the law of the land, supranational laws or international law, that apply not 
just to the members of one specifi c religious tradition, denomination or community, but to 
the general public, including members of other religions, denominations and communities, 
unaffi liated believers, ‘atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned’.13 In such an external 
dimension, the law of religion and human rights is bi-dimensional.
First, religion determines the quality and degree of the legal protection of human rights 
in a given society. Religious variations of human rights can coincide with the religiously 
inspired legal struggles for human rights of leaders like Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Dag 
Hammarskjöld and Desmond Tutu. But they can also coincide with the religious foundation and 
endorsement, in different times and places, of dictatorial governments, rejection of freedom 
of conscience, equality and rule of law, and denial of individual and collective rights. In this fi rst 
modality, religion shapes the legal action of local, national, or supranational governments in 
favour or to the detriment of human rights, or, more nuanced, towards a given interpretation 
of human rights.
Second, religion sets limits to the action of the government, for the sake of society at large 
and of religious organizations in particular. This can play in favour of human rights, whenever 
the government is likely to threaten them, and the civil society, and religious organizations, 
support human rights. But this can also prove harmful, if the initiative of the government in 
favour of human rights is hindered to the advantage of human rights unfriendly social and 
religious actors.
The religious infl uence on laws of general applicability in order for these to conform to a 
given religious human rights standard is the fi rst dimension of the external law of religion and 
human rights. The second dimension is the pressure of laws of general applicability on religious 
communities, that are required to conform to a given human rights standard.
Due to the second dimension’s threat on the self-rule of religious communities, a key 
concept for the development of the external law of religion and human rights is the principle 
Book 1.indb   168 20/11/14   2:56 PM
169
Human rights within religions
14 The European Court of Human Rights has recognized the principle of religious autonomy in Fernandez 
Martinez v. Spain, 15 May 2012, para. 80.
15 The category of ‘religious laws’ is used here, with the awareness that no all-encompassing defi nition 
does justice to its fundamental complexity, as warranted by Vanderlinden 2002: 170–1.
16 According to the author, religious laws comprise ‘the internal spiritual laws made by religious groups 
themselves’, and more precisely ‘both the rules found in sacred texts and also the more practical rules 
developed by religious groups themselves’ (Sandberg 2011: 169–70). The author further suggests that a 
fourfold defi nition is possible, based on the purpose, source, subject and knowledge (‘pedagogy’) of 
religious laws (2011: 172–80).
17 In his comparison of Jewish law and Christian canon law, Asher Maoz underlines this difference: ‘Rene 
David and John E.C. Brierly defi ne Judaism as ‘essentially a religion of the law’. ‘[T]he Catholic Church,’ 
on the other hand, ‘ . . . did . . . feel it unnecessary to develop a Christian law to take the place of Roman 
law . . . Canon law was not a complete legal system designed to replace Roman law. It complemented 
Roman law or other ‘private’ laws, never anything more, and regulated subjects not covered by these 
laws such as Church organization, the sacraments, and canonical procedure.’ The separation between 
spiritual and temporal matters, which is at the foundation of Christianity, is alien to Judaism for Judaism 
encompasses all aspects of society and of an individual’s life’ (Maoz 2004: 678).
18 European Court of Human Rights, Fernandez Martinez v. Spain, Grand Chamber 12 June 2014, para. 67.
of religious autonomy,14 protecting the ‘competence of religious communities to decide upon 
and administer their own affairs without governmental interference’, as well as the ‘right of 
self-determination for religious groups’ (Durham 2013: 6). Autonomy shields religious actors 
against governmental interference. In so doing, autonomy enables religious actors to display 
their twofold dynamic of appropriation and rejection of human rights, ultimately resulting in the 
interplay of religion with the whole society, members and non-members alike, by means of 
the external law of religion and human rights.
Internal law of religion and human rights
The internal law of religion and human rights describes the defi nition and protection of human 
rights within a specifi c religious tradition, denomination or community, that is within religious 
laws.15 Religious laws can be either entirely in the hands of religious authorities and institutions 
(e.g. justice according to Jewish law, as adjudicated by a rabbinical court with no State interfer-
ence), as Russell Sandberg would understand them,16 or can be defi ned and administered – 
entirely or partially – by State bodies (e.g. personal religious laws in India (see Ventura 2014: 
11–2) or the ecclesiastical law of the Church of England (see Hill 2007)). Also, religious laws can 
have a limited reach (this is most typically the case of Christian canon laws, which would have 
no ambition to regulate matters pertaining to, for example, land law or criminal law), or can be 
an all-encompassing legal system, such as in the case of Islamic or Jewish law.17
The internal law of religion and human rights depends on what in theory and in practice 
organized religion provides for in sensitive areas such as the right to choose and change one’s 
religion, the prerogatives of religious authorities like bishops, rabbis and muftis, operation of 
religious courts, distinctive treatment of women, children, unbelievers and other categories such 
as tribes or castes, individual and collective property rights, employment, education in general 
(e.g. religious schools) and in particular the authorization to teachers such as the Catholic ‘missio 
canonica, the Vokation of the Protestant Church, the Orthodox canonical mandate, the Jewish 
teaching certifi cate, the certifi cate delivered by the Islamic community’,18 censorship, organization 
of monastic communities, and family and marriage.
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19 Mashood Baderin discusses the idea that ‘Islamic law is incompatible with the ideals of international 
human rights and that human rights are not realizable within the dispensation of Islamic law’ (Baderin 
2003: 3).
20 Witte and Green 2012: 15. The authors argue that ‘to ignore religious rights is to overlook the 
conceptual, if not historical, source of any other individual and associational right’.
In the current debate on the interaction between human rights and religion, organized 
religions, and religious laws in particular, have grown decisive. As confl icts of interpretation 
around Sharia and human rights attest,19 the incompatibility between human rights and a specifi c 
religion is often vindicated in the name of the impossibility to reconcile the relevant religious 
law with human rights law.
Religious laws lay at the core of the four reasons offered by John Witte and M. Christian 
Green to explain why ‘human rights ultimately need religious ideas, institutions, and rights 
claims to survive and thrive’ (Witte and Green 2012: 15). First, without the right to live according 
to one’s own religious precepts, which is the right to religion, ‘many rights are cut from their 
roots’.20 Second, religious laws are essential in that they tie together rights and duties, 
thus preventing the regime of human rights from becoming ‘infi nitely expanding’ (Witte 
and Green 2012: 15). Third, religious laws resist the risk that human rights grow as ‘a system 
of rights that excludes, deprecates, or privatizes religion’ and therefore as a system that 
cannot be ‘respected and adopted’ (Witte and Green 2012: 15). Fourth, religious laws oppose 
the temptation to entrust human rights solely on the State, which would confer upon the 
government ‘an exaggerated role to play as the guarantor of human rights’ (Witte and Green 
2012: 16).
Religious laws are thus indispensable for the quality of the internal law of religion and human 
rights, but their impact is not confi ned to the relevant religious community. Witte and Green 
explain that ‘each [religious] tradition has developed its own internal system of legal procedures 
and structures for the protection of rights, which historically have [served] and still can serve as 
both prototypes and complements for secular legal systems’ (Witte and Green 2012: 16). Those 
religious laws that have developed before the Western modern State offer an alternative approach 
to rights, which is neither necessarily nor irredeemably an approach against human rights. This 
is true, in particular, for models of religious laws radically different from the rule of law model. 
In his study of the Mishpatim, the earliest collection of Biblical laws, Bernard Jackson underlines 
the intrinsic diversity of a model based on the interdependence of teaching and normative 
behaviour. ‘Wisdom-Laws,’ as Jackson categorizes the Mishpatim, challenge ‘the applicability of 
the “Rule of Law” conception in the following respects: (i) where linguistic rules are used in 
dispute settlement, their application is not to be identifi ed with the notion of ‘literal meaning’, 
but rather with their narrative, contextual sense; (ii) dispute settlement is conceived as an 
essentially private rather than a public matter, and judicial dispute resolution is to be avoided for 
both practical and social reasons: the earliest form of judicial dispute resolution rely upon 
intuitions of justice against a background of custom, rather than analysis of linguistically 
formulated rules (Jackson 2006: 24). Religious laws are also likely to convey a completely 
different approach to the source of law, and in particular to the articulation of civil society and 
the political elites. Wael Hallaq argues that ‘Islamic law did not emerge out of the machinery of 
the body-politic, but rather arose as a private enterprise initiated and developed by pious men 
who embarked on the study and elaboration of law as a religious activity’ (Hallaq 2005: 204). 
Hence the consequence that ‘never could the Islamic ruling elite, the body politic, determine 
what the law was’ (Hallaq 2005: 204).
Book 1.indb   170 20/11/14   2:56 PM
171
Human rights within religions
21 Doctrine and Covenant, 134:4. Available at www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/dc/134?lang=eng.
22 See US Supreme Court, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
et al. v. Amos et al., decided on 24 June 1987, 483 US (1987) 327.
If in the past religious laws were ‘prototypes and complements for secular legal systems’, as 
Witte and Green argue, in a time when the transnational reshaping of sovereignty and the rule 
of law decisively impacts on human rights, religious laws can offer valuable resources for the 
relevant community and for society at large. In this perspective, religious laws have a role to play 
that place them at the very heart of the interaction between the internal and the external law of 
religion and human rights. For better or worse, their infl uence is not limited to the members 
of the relevant religion, denomination or community. It extends to society at large.
If looked at through the perspective of religious laws, the external and internal spheres are 
conceptually distinct, but in practice they are interlocked. Indeed, the role of religious laws is as 
decisive when human rights are at stake in the conversation between members of the same 
religious tradition, denomination and community, as they are when human rights challenge the 
ability of religion to contribute to the advancement of a plural and diverse society.
The development of religious laws through human rights
Since World War II, the interaction with human rights has proved a crucial factor for the 
development of religious laws. In keeping with Marc DeGirolami’s scheme of variations of 
religious liberty, religious laws develop through human rights according to a threefold typology 
of variations.
First, ‘there is interreligious variation’ (DeGirolami 2013: 60) depending on how Protestant, 
Sikh, Jewish laws or other religious laws appropriate or reject human rights.
Second, ‘intrareligious variation’ is relevant, which comprises ‘(1) variation within traditions 
about the scope of acceptable dissent’ on how the relevant religious law should understand 
human rights, and ‘(2) variation within traditions about the scope of freedom from state intrusion’ 
through human rights (DeGirolami 2013: 61).
Third, ‘temporal variation’ implies that ‘even among members of the same religious 
community’ the relation of the relevant religious law to human rights ‘may change over time’ 
(DeGirolami 2013: 61).
At the junction between the internal and the external law of religion and human rights, the 
combination of religious laws and civil, constitutional and international human rights law results 
in four possible scenarios.
First, human rights-oriented reform in civil law and in religious law coincides. Repeal of 
sodomy laws in England and Wales has coincided with a substantial shift in the Churches 
of England and Wales on rights of homosexuals, including ordained people. In a different area, 
the Mormon principle that human law does not have the right ‘to interfere in prescribing rules 
of worship to bind the consciences of men, nor dictate forms for public or private devotion’21 
has pushed the Church of Jesus Christ and the Latter Day Saints to fi ght for religious freedom 
and State non-interference in the civil sphere.22
In the second scenario, both civil and religious laws are preserved from undesired human 
rights. This is the case with the upholding of capital punishment in both civil law and religious 
law, for instance in the States of Nigeria that incorporated Sharia law as criminal law in 2000, 
but also in the United States, to the extent that popular support of capital punishment is largely 
grounded on references to Biblical law.
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23 Justice Baker for the High Court of Justice, Family Division, deferred a family case to the Beth Din of 
New York and then guided the procedure, fi nally ordering the application of the Rabbinic Court’s 
decision. The judge so explained his choice: ‘at a time when there is much comment about the antagonism 
between the religious and secular elements of society, it was notable that the court was able not only to 
accommodate the parties’ wish to resolve their dispute by reference to their religious authorities, but also 
buttress that process at crucial stages – by adjourning the case for arbitration; by using wardship as a protective 
mechanism for the children pending the outcome of the arbitration; by making the “safe harbour” orders 
that enabled the mother to travel to New York with M for the purpose of taking part in the process; by 
holding an emergency interim contact hearing; and by giving provisional approval of the draft fi nal order 
to facilitate the granting of the Get.’ Para. 35. The judge further commented: ‘The parties’ devout beliefs had 
been respected. The outcome was in keeping with English law while achieved by a process rooted in the 
Jewish culture to which the families belong.’ Para. 37. Case of Rai and Mi, decided on 30 January 2013, 
2013 EWHC 100 (Fam).
24 UK Supreme Court, R v. Governing Body of JFS, decided on 16 December 2009, [2009] UKSC 15.
25 UK Supreme Court, Shergill and others v. Khaira and others, decided on 11 June 2014, [2014] UKSC 33. 
Lords Neuberger, Sumption and Hodge wrote: ‘[T]he courts do not adjudicate on the truth of religious 
beliefs or on the validity of particular rites. But where a claimant asks the court to enforce private rights 
and obligations which depend on religious issues, the judge may have to determine such religious issues 
as are capable of objective ascertainment. The court addresses questions of religious belief and practice 
where its jurisdiction is invoked either to enforce the contractual rights of members of a community 
against other members or its governing body or to ensure that property held on trust is used for the 
purposes of the trust’ (Para. 45).
26 European Court of Human Rights, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000. The Court 
acknowledged religious laws by recalling ‘that religious communities traditionally and universally exist 
in the form of organised structures. They abide by rules which are often seen by followers as being of a 
divine origin. Religious ceremonies have their meaning and sacred value for the believers if they have 
been conducted by ministers empowered for that purpose in compliance with these rules. The 
personality of the religious ministers is undoubtedly of importance to every member of the community’ 
(Para. 62).
27 European Court of Human Rights, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 27 June 2000.
Third, human rights are endorsed in civil law, but not in religious laws. This is the case, for 
example, with the Roman Catholic Church’s support to provisions prohibiting discrimination 
of women and LGBT people in civil labour law, in the face of the Church’s religious freedom 
claim of the right to select candidates to ministries, also based on gender and sex orientation.
Fourth, the same right is endorsed in civil law and in religious law, but with two distinct 
meanings and scopes: in principle, freedom of association is enshrined both in Roman Catholic 
canon law and in the constitutional law of countries under strong Catholic infl uence, but the 
understanding of freedom of association within the church, as provided for by Roman Catholic 
canon law, is defi nitely different from its interpretation in the constitutional law of Malta, Poland 
or Portugal.
The four scenarios do not always come in a well-defi ned way. The boundary between civil 
human rights and human rights in religious laws is particularly diffi cult to draw when civil 
courts are drained into religious disputes.
British civil courts have given application to procedures before religious courts while claiming 
they protected the rights of the parties under civil law.23 Also they have ruled on Jewish 
membership24 or on the leadership of the Sikh community,25 while rejecting the claim that by 
doing so they interfere with the religious doctrine of the relevant community.
In controversies within the Muslim community in Bulgaria26 or within the Jewish community 
in France,27 the European Court of Human Rights has found in favour or against the State, based 
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28 Deciding that Bulgaria had violated the religious freedom of the applicants, the Court considered that 
‘facts demonstrating a failure by the authorities to remain neutral in the exercise of their powers in this 
domain must lead to the conclusion that the State interfered with the believers’ freedom to manifest 
their religion’. The Court further noted that ‘but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of 
religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to 
determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate. State action 
favouring one leader of a divided religious community or undertaken with the purpose of forcing the 
community to come together under a single leadership against its own wishes would likewise constitute 
an interference with freedom of religion. In democratic societies the State does not need to take 
measures to ensure that religious communities are brought under a unifi ed leadership’ (European Court 
of Human Rights, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000, para. 78).
29 European Court of Human Rights, Schüth v. Germany, 23 September 2010.
30 European Court of Human Rights, Siebenhaar v. Germany, 3 February 2011.
31 European Court of Human Rights, Obst v. Germany, 23 September 2010.
32 In the concluding observations of 25 February 2014, the UN Committee affi rmed: ‘Committee is 
aware of the dual nature of the Holy See’s ratifi cation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as 
the Government of the Vatican City State and also as a sovereign subject of international law having an 
original, non-derived legal personality independent of any territorial authority or jurisdiction. While 
fully aware that bishops and major superiors of religious institutes do not act as representatives or 
delegates of the Roman Pontiff, the Committee notes that subordinates in Catholic religious orders are 
bound by obedience to the Pope, in accordance with Canons 331 and 590 of the Code of canon Law. 
The Committee therefore reminds the Holy See that in ratifying the Convention, it made a commitment 
to implement it not only within the territory of Vatican City State, but also, as the supreme power of 
the Catholic Church, worldwide through individuals and institutions under its authority.’ N. 8.
33 When the UN Committee argued that the legal personality of the Holy See, as a signatory to the UN 
Convention, made the Holy See liable under canon law, the Holy See’s spokesperson replied that the 
Holy See, Vatican City, the Roman Catholic Church and its law (canon law) should not be confused. 
Father Lombardi explained ‘the peculiar nature of the Holy See in its quality of international law 
subject which adheres to the Convention, with a particular focus in the distinction from, and relationship 
with, the Vatican City State . . . and in relation with the Catholic Church, as a worldwide community of 
devoted people living all around the world . . . the members of which are subject to the law of the States 
in which they live and operate.’ Father Lombardi also explained the ‘peculiar and specifi c nature of 
canon law, solely pertaining to the Catholic Church and well – distinct from the civil laws of the other 
States’ (Lombardi 2014). [Author’s translation: ‘spiegare e precisare la natura particolare della Santa Sede 
come soggetto di diritto internazionale che aderisce alla Convenzione, in particolare nella sua distinzione 
e nel suo rapporto con lo Stato della Città del Vaticano . . . e in rapporto alla Chiesa cattolica, come 
comunità dei fedeli cattolici sparsi nel mondo . . . i cui membri vivono sottomessi alle leggi degli Stati 
dove vivono ed operano . . . la natura particolare e specifi ca della legge canonica, propria della Chiesa 
cattolica e ben distinta dalle leggi civili degli Stati.’]
on the government’s interference with the self-determination of the relevant community.28 
The same European court witnessed the overlapping of civil and religious jurisdictions in the 
development of religious laws, when confronted with ecclesiastical authorities applying their 
laws in order to dismiss a Roman Catholic church organist,29 a Roman Catholic child-minder 
in a Protestant church school,30 and a public relations manager for the Mormon Church of Jesus 
Christ and the Latter Day Saints.31
In yet another example of confl icting principles in the application of human rights to religious 
laws, touching upon the scope of religious laws, the United Nations Committee for the Rights 
of the Child has called for an amendment of Roman Catholic canon law, in the interest of a 
better protection of minors, such a call being held the legitimate implication of the international 
obligations of the Holy See.32 Catholic authorities have rebutted that the mandate of the United 
Nations in the fi eld of human rights does not confer upon the Committee any competence on 
Roman Catholic canon law.33
Book 1.indb   173 20/11/14   2:56 PM
Marco Ventura
174
34 This is a very sensitive area for European churches. For an attempt to design an approach to human 
rights consistent with the theology and law of Protestant and Orthodox Churches, see Kitanovic 2012.
35 Witte and Green 2012: 20. The authors suggest that such a ‘hermeneutic of history’ would demand a 
return to ‘slender streams of theological jurisprudence that have not been part of the mainstream of the 
Beyond the incident between the United Nations and the Roman Catholic Church, the 
scandal of sex abuses on minors by clerics has triggered debate and reform within the Roman 
Catholic Church on how to best protect the rights of both the victims and the accused, this 
challenging the Roman Catholic distinctive and differentiated approach to rights outside 
and inside the Church (see Coughlin 2010, in particular Chapters 2 and 3). With Protestant 
and Orthodox Churches also struggling with negotiating a fair balance between their laws and 
human rights,34 the issue concerns Christian churches as a whole.
Norman Doe lists among his 50 principles of law common to Christian Churches, at n. 48, 
‘Human rights and religious freedom’. The principle is articulated as follows:
(1) All humans are created in the image of God; (2) All humans share an equality of dignity 
and fundamental human rights; (3) The State should recognize, respect and promote basic 
human rights; (4) The church should protect and defend human rights in society for all 
people, and, like the church, the State and society should not discriminate against individuals 
on grounds of race, gender and colour; (5) The State should recognize, promote and protect 
the religious freedom of churches corporately and of the faithful individually, as well as their 
freedom of conscience. 
(Doe 2013: 397)
Interestingly enough, Doe does not consider respect of human rights within the churches as a 
principle of law common to Christian Churches, or at least he does not make this principle 
explicit, although he includes in his list due process and other similar principles.
Islamic documents such as the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights of 1981 or the 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam adopted by the Organization of Islamic Conference in 
Cairo on 5 August 1990 (Baderin 2003: 237–42) offer yet another example of overlapping civil 
and religious defi nitions of human rights.
Witte and Green observe that a new ‘human rights hermeneutic’ is ‘slowly beginning to 
emerge among modern religions’ (2012: 19). This is a fourfold hermeneutic ‘of confession’, ‘of 
suspicion’, of ‘history’ and ‘of law and religion’.
First, ‘confession and restitution’ are essential steps for ‘any religious community to engage 
with human rights fully’ (Witte and Green 2012: 19): religious communities have to carry on 
confessing that ‘their theologian and jurists have resisted the importation of human rights as 
much as they have helped in their cultivation’ and that ‘their internal policies and external 
advocacy have helped to perpetuate bigotry, chauvinism and violence, as much as they have 
served to propagate equality, liberty, and fraternity’ (Witte and Green 2012: 19–20).
Second, a ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ is needed, in the name of which religious laws would 
challenge the temptation to ‘idolize or idealize’ recent formulations of human rights, while 
contributing to the development of ‘a more pluralistic model of interpretation’ (Witte and Green 
2012: 20).
Third, a ‘hermeneutic of history’ would challenge religious laws to free religious sources from 
‘the casuistic accretions of generations of jurists’ as well as from ‘the cultural trappings of the 
communities in which these traditions were born’.35
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religious traditions, or have become diluted by too great a commingling with it’, as well as to ‘prophetic 
voices of dissent, long purged from traditional religious canons, but, in retrospect, prescient of ’ the 
benefi cial role that tradition might play today.
36 Charfi  2000: 149. [Author’s translation: ‘Les lois religieuses sont souvent prises pour des lois immuables. 
Or la notion d’immutabilité est contraire à la nature des choses. Même pour les ibadat, c’est à dire tout 
ce qui concerne les rapports de l’homme avec Dieu (prière, jeune . . .), rares sont les règles qui pourraient 
être valables pour tous les temps et tous les lieux comme le veut la charia.’]
Finally, a ‘hermeneutic of law and religion’ would require religious laws to challenge the 
assumption that ‘law is an autonomous discipline, free from the infl uence of religion and belief ’ 
and that ‘law and politics must be hermetically and hermeneutically sealed from the corrosive 
infl uences of religious believers and bodies’ (Witte and Green 2012: 20).
Based on Witte and Green’s vision of the challenge of human rights to religious laws, it is 
possible to read the twofold movement of religious appropriation and rejection of human rights 
as entailing a twofold effort of, respectively, reform and preservation of religious laws, such effort 
being crucial for the development of religious laws.
Reform of religious laws
In its more visible legal incarnation, religious appropriation of human rights operates through 
religious claims and infl uence in civil, constitutional and international law. However, the internal 
struggle for human rights oriented improvement of religious rules and procedures among those 
who share the same faith and belong to the same community is as decisive. Three factors make 
reform of religious laws a crucial area for the advancement of human rights and for human rights 
driven development of religious laws.
The fi rst factor is change. Religious rules are often powerful justifi cations for the perpetuation 
of patterns incompatible with human dignity and rights. No true change is possible without 
a change in those laws to which people feel attached out of deeply held religious beliefs. 
As Mohamed Charfi  pointed out in his advocacy of reform of Islamic law, ‘religious laws are 
often taken as immutable laws. Well, the very notion of immutability runs against the nature 
of things. Even in the fi eld of ibadat, which covers the relation of man to God (prayer, 
fasting . . .), only a very few rules can be held as valid for all the times and places, as Sharia has 
it.’36 By engaging with reform of their laws, religious communities are urged to experience 
innovative ways of approaching the interpretation of sacred texts, decision-making procedures, 
the resolution of disputes, judicial or otherwise, and the structure of powers. Such an effort of 
innovation is vital for the advancement of religion, of law and society, and of human rights 
themselves.
The second factor is stability. Reform of religious laws entails a systematic discernment of 
what has to stay and what has to go. By validating the basics, and by adapting to new circumstances, 
religious communities achieve stability within, and contribute to stability in society at large. This 
is particularly true for human rights, the stability of which is increased as a result of their 
assessment through the building of a plurality of religious laws of human rights, complementary 
to the plurality of human rights systems in civil, constitutional and international law. In this 
perspective reform of religious laws assesses the very foundation of systems of human rights, and 
the possibility of a multi-level, pluralistic global convergence on human rights. In fact, 
appropriation of human rights through reform of religious laws implies a conversation between 
the identity and specifi city of a given religious tradition, denomination or community, and 
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37 Portraying the debate on human rights in Roman Catholic canon law, Rik Torfs writes: ‘We must get 
away from the tendency to employ fundamental rights as a means of securing particular rights, though 
this tendency is understandable in an institution, such as the church, which is, in the technical sense of 
the term, undemocratic. Seen from this perspective, fundamental rights serve as a dam against the 
discretionary power of the authorities, a power which is not always suffi ciently restrained in practice. 
However, basic rights are much more than an instrument for defence: to force them into this role betrays 
a nineteenth-century liberal mentality. Basic rights gain in moral authority, in the Church as well, 
whenever it is clear from their concrete coloration that they are not simply hollow demands made by 
the Me-generation but, on the contrary, that they raise the quality of life in the Church to a higher level’ 
(Torfs 1995: 89). Further background in Coriden and Örsy 1969.
38 In this regard, Charfi  exposed that ‘it is clear what the notion of specifi city invoked by fundamentalists 
to counter the universality of human rights is about. It is nothing else than a means to legitimise 
coercion, oppression and attacks on the freedom and the equality of human beings’ (Charfi  2000: 101). 
[Author’s translation: ‘La notion de spécifi cité invoquée par les intégristes pour contrer l’universalité des 
droits de l’homme apparaît sous son vrai jour. Ce n’est qu’un moyen de légitimer la contrainte, 
l’oppression, les atteintes qu’on veut continuer à porter à la liberté de l’homme et à l’égalité entre les 
êtres humains.’]
39 DeGirolami 2013: 101. See more generally pp. 100–6.
the many systems of human rights, this often meaning a negotiation of the cultural and the 
intercultural, and of the local and the global.
The third factor is diversity. Reform of religious laws encourages diversity within religious 
communities, through debate and differentiation, and diversity in human rights. Of course 
diversity in and through religious laws can be highly divisive,37 and challenging for those 
who claim that the wholeness and universalism of human rights should be protected, just as 
the identity of religious community should be preserved. The complexity and ambiguity of the 
argument of diversity and specifi city is well illustrated by the debate among Islamic law scholars.38
While pointing at the importance of reform of religious laws, the three factors also illustrate 
the importance of preservation of religious laws. In fact, mirroring the tight interconnection of 
religious appropriation and rejection of human rights, reform and preservation of religious laws 
prove two indivisible sides of the same coin.
Preservation of religious laws
It is very commonly held that human rights should change religious laws from outside, as a 
standard imposed top down by supranational or national governments. In the face of such 
a claim, preservation of religious laws becomes a crucial implication of the religious rejection of 
human rights.
The meaning of preservation of religious laws can be assessed through the same three-factors 
test administered to reform of religious laws.
First, preservation of religious laws is about a kind of change desirable to all those who 
would feel for religion in terms of custom and tradition, as opposed to disruptive, violent and 
revolutionary change. Marc DeGirolami advocates this kind of change when praising ‘changes 
that resemble growth rather than the grafting of new shoots, changes that imitate what is already 
existing rather than replacing it, changes that respond to some local or particular defect rather 
than those with more general and comprehensive aims, changes that proceed gradually with the 
possibility of readjustment, changes whose consequences can be reasonably anticipated.’39
Second, preservation of religious laws secures stability. The allegiance of religious communities 
to their laws is based on the fact that those laws are God-given and validated through tradition 
and custom. Hastily carried changes, especially when imposed from outside in the name of an 
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alien legal order might result in a serious threat to social cohesion and to the perpetuation of 
cherished values and habits.
Third, preservation of religious laws strengthens diversity. This is fi rst of all true within 
religions. The various doctrinal schools within Sunni Islamic law, the Latin and the Eastern codes 
of canon law within Roman Catholicism and the multiple churches within the Calvinist 
tradition are witnesses to a preservation of religious laws, which is essential for a plural legal 
environment. Faced with the risk that the defence of religious laws be synonymous of a reluctant 
compliance to international standards of human rights, and thus that the value of diversity be 
hijacked for the unacceptable purpose of avoiding a serious assessment of religious laws in 
the light of human rights law, religious traditions, denominations and communities share the 
responsibility to demonstrate that diversity is not a foe, but an ally of human rights.
Conclusions
Refl ecting on law and religion, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert A. Yelle and Mateo Taussig-
Rubbo emphasize that ‘while, for the most part, the very expression “law and religion” refl ects 
an assumption that law is different and separate from religion – that they are discrete kinds of 
things, separate species if not members of different kingdoms altogether – in fact, regarded 
more closely, their overlapping functions defi ne a range of possible relationships that law has to 
religion, as complement and mutual support, as competitor, or as successor’ (Sullivan, Yelle and 
Taussig-Rubbo 2011: 3). The authors argue that developments in the interaction of law and 
religion will defi ne legal issues such as ‘evolving trial processes, the law of evidence, the defi ning 
and redefi ning of citizenship, state security systems, family law, the law of property, new practices 
of sacrifi ce on the part of the military and the citizenry, new formations of sacral sovereignty, the 
transformation of geographically located religious traditions into more portable modernist ideas 
and practices, the consequences of transnational migration, and changes to electoral politics’ 
(ibid.: 4). This chapter argues that the same is true for human rights and religion, the interaction 
of which should be observed and understood as taking place not outside, but within religion.
Advancement in the study and advocacy of human rights is intimately dependent on their 
relation to religion. The rise of modern human rights has triggered a twofold movement of 
religious appropriation and rejection of human rights, a crucial legal translation of which is the 
twofold movement of reform and preservation of religious laws. As described above, based on the 
combination of religious variations of human rights and human rights’ variations of religion, 
developments of religious laws encapsulate the external and the internal law of religion and 
human rights. Within this conceptual framework, in its blurred practical manifestations, the 
actors will make their decisions. The struggle with human rights ‘within’ religion will be decisive 
for the future of both human rights, and religious traditions, denominations and communities.
Author’s note: PhD Strasbourg, Professor of Canon Law and Law and Religion, Faculty of 
Canon Law, KU Leuven. Professor of Law and Religion, Faculty of Law, University of Siena. 
Associate member of DRES, Droit, Religion, Entreprise et Société, University of Strasbourg. I 
express my thanks to Mariano Croce for comments and suggestions.
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